William Lane Craig on The problem of evil
Craig argues that the problem of evil fails as a disproof of God and that God may have morally sufficient reasons for permitting suffering.
Craig has debated the problem of evil more than any other living philosopher of religion, and his response is carefully structured. He distinguishes the logical problem of evil (evil is logically incompatible with God) from the evidential problem (evil makes God's existence improbable). He considers the logical problem solved by Alvin Plantinga's free will defence and focuses on the evidential version.
Against the evidential problem, Craig argues that we are not in a position to judge that God lacks morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evils we observe. Our cognitive limitations — what he calls 'cognitive finitude' — mean that our inability to see a good reason for a particular evil does not entail that there is no such reason. This is not an appeal to mystery but a recognition of epistemic humility.
Craig also argues that Christian theism has unique resources for addressing evil: the doctrines of the afterlife, divine solidarity in suffering (the cross), and eschatological justice. If God exists, the suffering of this life is not the final word — and the scales will ultimately be balanced.
“The problem of evil does not disprove God's existence. At most, it shows that if God exists, he has reasons for permitting evil that we may not fully understand.”
“We are not in a good position to assess with confidence the probability that God has no morally sufficient reason for permitting any particular evil.”