William Lane Craig on Morality without God
Craig argues that while atheists can behave morally, they cannot ground objective moral values without God.
Craig carefully distinguishes between moral epistemology and moral ontology. He readily concedes that atheists can know moral truths and behave morally — his argument is not about behaviour but about foundations. Without God, he contends, there is no adequate basis for objective moral values and duties.
On naturalism, Craig argues, human beings are just advanced primates whose moral intuitions are the product of evolution and social conditioning. There is no reason to think these intuitions track objective moral truth rather than merely promoting survival. Morality without God reduces to subjective preference or social convention — real enough psychologically, but with no binding authority.
Craig sees this as one of his strongest arguments because most people — including most atheists — believe that some things are genuinely, objectively wrong. If that belief is correct, Craig argues, then God exists. The atheist who affirms objective morality is, in his view, borrowing capital from a worldview he has rejected.
“My argument is not that atheists cannot be moral. Of course they can. My argument is that without God, objective moral values and duties do not exist.”