Lawrence Krauss on The problem of evil
Krauss frames the problem of evil in terms of the indifferent physical processes that cause suffering, arguing they are incompatible with a caring creator.
Lawrence Krauss approaches the problem of evil from the perspective of a physicist who understands the mechanisms by which suffering is produced. Earthquakes result from plate tectonics, diseases from the evolution of pathogens, genetic disorders from random mutations. These processes are impersonal, indifferent, and entirely explicable without reference to purpose or design. The suffering they produce is not punishment, not a lesson, and not part of a plan — it is simply the byproduct of physical law.
Krauss has argued that the sheer scale and randomness of suffering in the natural world is incompatible with any plausible version of a loving, omnipotent God. A tsunami does not distinguish between the righteous and the wicked. Childhood leukaemia strikes without regard to the moral character of the child or the prayers of the parents. If this is the work of a designer, that designer either does not care about suffering or is powerless to prevent it.
In his debates with theologians, Krauss has been characteristically direct: the problem of evil is not a philosophical puzzle to be solved with clever theodicies. It is an empirical observation that the universe operates exactly as you would expect if no benevolent intelligence were supervising it. The simplest explanation for gratuitous suffering is that there is no one in charge.
“The universe doesn't care about you. That's not a philosophical position — it's an observation. Earthquakes don't check the prayer lists before they strike.”