Jordan Peterson on The Kalam cosmological argument
Peterson has not directly engaged with the Kalam argument but treats the question of ultimate origins as existentially rather than logically significant.
Jordan Peterson has not, to any significant degree, engaged with the Kalam cosmological argument as William Lane Craig formulates it. The formal syllogistic structure of the Kalam — with its premises about causation and the beginning of the universe — is not the kind of argument Peterson typically deploys. His approach to the question of origins is existential and psychological rather than logical and cosmological.
When Peterson discusses the origin of the universe, he is more interested in what the question means for human beings than in what the answer might be. The confrontation with the mystery of existence — the fact that anything exists rather than nothing — is, for Peterson, a foundational religious experience. But he does not attempt to move from this experience to a deductive proof of God's existence.
Peterson would likely find the Kalam argument interesting as an expression of the human need to ground reality in something ultimate, but he would be unlikely to rest much weight on it. His theological commitments, such as they are, rest on the phenomenology of meaning and suffering rather than on cosmological syllogisms.