Daniel Dennett on Divine command theory
Dennett argued that morality is a natural phenomenon that evolved independently of any divine legislator.
Dennett's rejection of divine command theory was grounded in his broader project of naturalising the mind and morality. In Darwin's Dangerous Idea and Freedom Evolves, he argued that moral behaviour — cooperation, fairness, punishment of free riders, care for offspring — evolved through natural selection because it promoted the survival of social groups. Morality is not a set of commands issued from above but a set of strategies that emerged from below.
He invoked the Euthyphro dilemma to challenge the logical coherence of divine command theory. If God commands the good because it is good, then goodness is independent of God. If the good is whatever God commands, then morality is arbitrary. Dennett saw this dilemma as decisive and was impatient with attempts to escape it by identifying God's nature with the good — a move he regarded as semantically empty.
Dennett also argued that divine command theory is psychologically damaging. Teaching people that morality comes from obedience to authority — rather than from empathy, reason, and the recognition of others' interests — produces a fragile moral framework that collapses when the authority is questioned. Secular morality, by contrast, is self-sustaining because it is grounded in reasons, not commands.
“The idea that we need God to be good is not just wrong — it is insulting. It implies that without divine surveillance, we would all be monsters.”