Dan Barker on Divine command theory
Barker uses the Euthyphro dilemma and the Bible's own moral record to argue that divine command theory is both logically incoherent and morally bankrupt.
Dan Barker's critique of divine command theory is among his most well-developed arguments, drawing on both philosophy and his intimate knowledge of scripture. He invokes the Euthyphro dilemma — is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? — and argues that neither horn is acceptable to the theist. If goodness is independent of God, divine command theory is false. If goodness is whatever God commands, morality is arbitrary.
Barker drives the point home with scripture. The God of the Old Testament commands the slaughter of the Amalekites, including women and children; endorses slavery; mandates the execution of disobedient sons; and orders the killing of anyone who works on the Sabbath. If divine command theory is true, these actions were morally good — a conclusion that Barker regards as self-evidently monstrous.
As a former preacher, Barker knows the standard defences: that God had morally sufficient reasons, that the culture was different, that the commands must be read in context. He argues that these defences prove his point — if we must use our own moral judgment to evaluate and contextualise God's commands, then our moral judgment is the real authority, not divine command.
“If God told you to kill your child, would you do it? If you say yes, you are a danger to society. If you say no, you have just admitted that your morality does not come from God.”