Christopher Hitchens on Consciousness and the soul
Hitchens saw the soul as a comforting fiction, unsupported by evidence and rendered unnecessary by neuroscience.
Hitchens addressed the soul primarily as a moral and political concept rather than a metaphysical one. He argued that the doctrine of the soul — and its corollary, eternal punishment — is one of religion's most pernicious contributions to human thought. The idea that an immaterial essence survives death and can be eternally tormented provides the theological warrant for the most extravagant cruelties: inquisitions, witch burnings, and the terrorising of children with visions of hell.
On the empirical question, Hitchens deferred to neuroscience while adding his characteristic rhetorical edge. The evidence that consciousness depends on brain function is overwhelming — personality changes with brain damage, disappears under anaesthesia, develops through childhood, and deteriorates in old age. If the soul exists and is responsible for consciousness, it is doing a remarkably poor job of maintaining independence from the organ it supposedly inhabits.
Hitchens regarded the wish for immortality as understandable but ultimately degrading. The desire to live forever reflects, in his view, not a noble aspiration but a failure to come to terms with the finitude that gives life its meaning and urgency. A finite life, honestly lived, was for Hitchens worth infinitely more than an eternity of celestial servitude.
“I'm not afraid of being dead. I'm afraid of the process of dying. But I've never been afraid of not existing. I didn't exist for billions of years before I was born and I didn't suffer the slightest inconvenience.”
“The offer of certainty, the offer of complete security, the offer of an impermeable faith that can't give way, is an offer of something not worth having.”