Alex O'Connor on Divine command theory
O'Connor presses the Euthyphro dilemma and argues that modified divine command theory is circular.
O'Connor has engaged extensively with divine command theory in debates with Craig and other apologists. His central argument is that the Euthyphro dilemma remains devastating despite Craig's attempt to resolve it by grounding goodness in God's nature rather than God's will.
O'Connor argues that saying 'God's nature is the standard of goodness' is either circular or empty. If we ask why God's nature is good, and the answer is 'because it is God's nature,' then we have defined goodness as 'whatever God happens to be like' — which is no more informative than 'good means good.' If, on the other hand, we recognise God's nature as good because it has properties we independently recognise as good (love, justice, mercy), then our recognition is doing the work, not God.
He also raises the problem of moral epistemology: even if divine command theory is true, we have no reliable way of knowing what God commands. The Bible is interpreted differently by every denomination, and conflicting claims of divine revelation cancel each other out.
“If God's nature is good by definition, then you have defined goodness rather than discovered it. And that is a very different kind of foundation than the one Craig needs.”