Alex O'Connor on The argument from miracles
O'Connor applies Bayesian reasoning to miracle claims, arguing that naturalistic explanations are virtually always more probable.
Alex O'Connor approaches miracle claims with the analytical tools of a philosophy student rather than the rhetorical flair of a polemicist. His treatment draws heavily on Bayesian reasoning: given the prior probability that natural laws hold, and the well-documented unreliability of human testimony under conditions of emotional arousal and religious expectation, the probability that a reported miracle actually occurred is vanishingly small.
O'Connor has engaged with miracle arguments in conversations with scholars like Gary Habermas and Mike Licona, particularly on the resurrection of Jesus. His approach is not to dismiss the evidence outright but to weigh it carefully — and to show that even on the most generous reading of the historical evidence, the probability of a naturalistic explanation (hallucination, legend development, motivated reasoning) remains far higher than the probability that a man rose from the dead.
He is particularly effective at pointing out the double standard in miracle evaluation. Christians who accept the resurrection of Jesus on ancient testimony would never accept a Hindu miracle or a Muslim miracle on equivalent evidence. The standard of evidence shifts depending on which miracle is being evaluated — which suggests the conclusion is driving the evaluation, not the other way around.
“You wouldn't accept this standard of evidence for any miracle claim from another religion. The question is why you accept it for your own.”