Compatibilism

The position has a long history. Hobbes, Hume, and Locke all defended versions of it; today it is the majority view among professional philosophers (the 2020 PhilPapers survey found about 59% endorse it). The compatibilist's central move is to redefine "free." Freedom is not the metaphysical power to do otherwise in identical circumstances — that may well be incoherent or impossible. Freedom is acting on your own reasons, desires, and values, without coercion, compulsion, or relevant cognitive impairment. Determinism does not preclude that.

The classic illustration: a person who hands over their wallet to an armed robber acts under coercion and so unfreely; a person who hands over money at a checkout acts on their own purposes and so freely. Both events are presumably fully caused by prior states of the world. The difference is the kind of cause, not the presence or absence of causation. Compatibilists argue this distinction is what we actually mean — and what we need — when we hold someone responsible.

Theological compatibilism applies the same move to divine determination: even if God's foreknowledge and providence determine what I will do, I am free in the relevant sense provided I act from my own desires and reasons rather than under external coercion. Jonathan Edwards developed this position rigorously in the 18th century, and it remains the standard view among Reformed theologians.

Critics — "libertarians" in the philosophical sense, not the political one — argue that compatibilist freedom is freedom in name only. Robert Kane and Peter van Inwagen argue that genuine moral responsibility requires the metaphysical power to have done otherwise, which determinism rules out. Hard determinists like Derk Pereboom agree with the libertarians that compatibilist freedom is too thin and conclude we should give up moral responsibility along with libertarian free will. The compatibilist's reply is that this entire debate trades on a metaphysical conception of freedom we never needed in the first place.